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Somali Piracy— 
Are We at the End Game? 
Jon Huggins* & Liza Kane-Hartnett† 
“Somali Piracy—Are We at the End Game?” examines the 
current state of Somali piracy and provides recommendations 
for reaching a sustainable solution both at sea and onshore. The 
authors provide a detailed background on international efforts to 
mitigate piracy and over the course of the article attempt to put 
the goals of both nations and international organizations, and 
the shipping industry, into context by: (1) assessing how close 
we have come to the “End Game” of piracy; (2) taking a closer 
look at the current positive trends and statistics; (3) evaluating 
the primary factors that must be considered in developing a 
long-term and sustainable solution at sea; and (4) addressing 
the importance of on-shore based initiatives. They conclude that 
while the initial crisis has been mitigated, a continued 
commitment and an increased focus on onshore initiatives are 
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needed to ensure that a long-term and sustainable solution to 
Somali-based piracy is reached.  
CONTENTS 
I.   Introduction ........................................................................... 356 
II.   Are We Ready to Declare “End Game?” ............................... 358 
III.   A Closer Examination of Positive Trends and Statistics ..... 359 
A.  Attack Reporting .......................................................................... 359 
B.  The Shipping Industry’s Continued Commitment ............................. 360 
C.  The Naval Response ..................................................................... 362 
D.  The Possible Return to Historic (Pre-Piracy) Levels of Maritime 
Security ....................................................................................... 362 
IV.   Assumptions and Primary Factors for Consideration ........... 364 
A.  Factor One: Response Capability at Sea ......................................... 364 
B.  Factor Two: Maritime Situational Awareness and Reporting ............ 366 
C.  Factor Three: Law Enforcement on the High Seas ........................... 368 
D.  Factor Four: Vessel Awareness/Protection ..................................... 370 
E.  Factor Five: Conditions of Seafarers .............................................. 371 
V.   Governance Ashore – The Real End Game for 
Somali Piracy .......................................................................... 373 
VI.   Conclusion ............................................................................... 374 
I.  Introduction 
The Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) program, a project of the One 
Earth Future Foundation,1 was initiated at the absolute height of the 
Somali piracy crisis in the fall of 2010. At that time, nearly 700 
hostages were being held in over thirty ships off the coast of Somalia. 
In order to understand the complex nature of the piracy attacks, and 
the equally complex response, OBP cultivated a relationship with 
multiple stakeholders across the international navies, maritime 
nations, industries, advocacy groups, and academia.  
After initial setbacks, where the pirates seemed able to adapt and 
effectively counter actions taken by the international community, the 
response at sea finally turned the tide against the Somali pirates. 
Through the combined efforts of industry and navies, pirate attacks 
were suppressed, and pirate groups were mostly deterred from 
 
1. The Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) program is a project of the One 
Earth Future Foundation, a privately funded and independent non-
profit organization located in Colorado, USA. OBP was launched in 
2010 with the intent to develop a response to maritime piracy through: 
mobilizing stakeholders from the maritime community; developing 
public-private partnerships to promote long-term solutions at sea and 
ashore; and encouraging sustainable deterrence based on the rule of law. 
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launching new assaults.2 Much of the coordination required to 
accomplish this can be credited to the efforts of the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),3 the Shared Awareness and 
De-confliction (SHADE) coordination mechanism for navies,4 and 
industry efforts to coordinate ship self-defense through agreed Best 
Management Practices (BMP).  
Throughout this three-year process, OBP has remained engaged 
by close association with CGPCS activities and by convening 
meetings with relevant stakeholders. After the international 
community achieved a milestone of six consecutive months without a 
successful pirate attack by the fall of 2012, OBP asked its partners to 
participate in a working group to develop expectations and define the 
desired end state to the Somali piracy threat. For the purposes of 
defining goals, the group was split between members of the shipping 
industry and those representing nations and international 
organizations. The group representing the nations and international 
organizations determined that continued observance of BMP and a 
sustained international navy presence would facilitate a move toward 
regional leadership and development ashore, establishing a safe and 
sustainable environment for merchant vessels and seafarers in the Red 
Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The 
group representing the shipping industry came to a similar conclusion, 
desiring to establish a set of conditions in the Red Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean whereby vessels can 
return to transit procedures and self-protection requirements in place 
before 2005 without undue risk to the crew. 
Over the course of this article, we shall attempt to put these goals 
into context by: (1) assessing how close we have come to the “End 
Game” for Somali-based piracy; (2) taking a closer look at the current 
positive trends and statistics; (3) evaluating the primary factors that 
must be considered in developing a long-term and sustainable solution 
at sea; and (4) addressing the importance of shore-based initiatives.  
 
2. See Piracy Falls in 2012, but Seas off East and West Africa Remain 
Dangerous Says IMB, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2013/Piracy-falls-in-2012,-but-
seas-off-East-and-West-Africa-remain-dangerous,-says-IMB/. 
3. See Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Quarterly 
Update, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.state.gov/t/ 
pm/rls/fs/2013/219088.htm (summarizing CGPCS’ efforts to curtail the 
incidents and effects of piracy through international cooperation).  
4. See, e.g., 19th SHADE Meets to Discuss Counter-Piracy, COMBINED 
MAR. FORCES (May 17, 2011), http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ 
2011/05/17/19th-shade-meets-to-discuss-counter-piracy/ (stating that 
SHADE meets regularly to coordinate the efforts of multiple military 
forces in order to combat piracy).  
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II.  Are We Ready to Declare “End Game?” 
With the dramatic drop in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and 
Western Indian Ocean, some stakeholders are cautiously asking 
whether the international community has successfully ended 
Somali-based piracy. The fact that knowledgeable policymakers are 
having this debate indicates that things are going much better than 
they could have hoped just eighteen months ago. On the surface, 
much of the evidence supports a conclusion that the problem has been 
solved. For example, reported attacks have dropped by more than 80 
percent between 2011 and 2012;5 2013 saw a continued decline, with 
the IMB reporting only 15 incidents, both actual and attempted 
attacks, attributed to Somali pirates.6 The number of hostages has 
dropped to fewer than 100 in 2013—down from a high of around 700 
hostages at the beginning of 2011.7 Finally, as of May 2013, it had 
been more than a year since pirates had hijacked and held a ship.8 
In spite of the good news, the world has not yet reaped the 
benefits from this drop in attacks. The cost of suppressing piracy in 
terms of first order costs had only decreased by around 20 percent to 
around $6 billion according to the latest Economic Cost of Piracy 
Report by OBP.9 The World Bank has also estimated that, even in a 
down year, piracy impacted the global economy to the tune of around 
 
5. See Alaric Nightingale, Somali Pirates Seize 80% Fewer Ships as Early 
Strikes Work, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-01-19/piracy-declines-for-first-time-in-five-years-as-navies-
intervene.html.  
6. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS: REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2013, at 5 
(2014).  
7. See OFFICER OF THE WATCH, MARITIME PIRACY MONTHLY REPORT 2 
(2013), available at http://officerofthewatch.files.wordpress.com/2013/ 
09/oow-piracy-monthly-report-2013-081.pdf; KAIJA HURLBURT & CYRUS 
MODY, THE HUMAN COST OF SOMALI PIRACY 2011, at 3 (2012), available 
at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View 
%20Full%20Report_0.pdf.  
8. See No Somali Pirate Hijacking in Nearly a Year, Says UN, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
may/03/somali-pirate-hijacking (stating that while pirate attacks were 
still occurring, there had not been a successful pirate attack since 
May 2012). 
9. Jonathan Bellish, The Economic Cost of Piracy 2012, at iv (2013) 
(working paper) (on file with Oceans Beyond Piracy & One Earth 
Future Found.), available at 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%2
0Full%20Report_1.pdf. 
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$18 billion when the secondary impacts were considered.10 Thus, 
despite successful suppression efforts, the international community is 
still paying a premium price in its fight against piracy. 
III.  A Closer Examination of Positive Trends and 
Statistics 
A.  Attack Reporting 
While reported attacks are down 80 percent since 2011, there are 
signs that some attacks may have only been reported amongst 
internal channels of owners and flag states, meaning that the attacks 
were not included in international databases and reporting. Earlier 
this year, two of the leading reporting agencies made the following 
appeals: 
It has come to our attention that some private military security 
companies are reporting suspicious incidents through their 
internal communication channels and then to their customers. It 
is in all seafarer[s]’ interest[s] that any concerns are reported 
immediately by phone to [the United Kingdom Maritime Trade 
Organization] UKMTO in accordance with BMP4.11 
Additionally, the NATO Shipping Center also issued a call for more 
timely and accurate reporting in a weekly report from February 2013, 
stating: 
It has been observed that some Masters are choosing to phone 
their Company Security Officer (CSO) first in the event of a 
piracy incident. However, one of the fundamental requirements 
of BMP4 is that UKMTO is the primary point of contact for 
merchant vessels during piracy incidents in the HRA. This aims 
to avoid unnecessary delay and prevent inaccurate or 
incomplete information from reaching military commanders.12 
In addition to calls for more accurate reporting by information centers 
serving the Indian Ocean, there was circumstantial evidence that 
indicated that not all attacks were being reported. First, based on 
military statistics, the span between the end of 2011 and the start of 
2012 was a particularly active time for Pirate Action Groups 
 
10. See THE WORLD BANK, THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, 
REBUILDING A NATION 5 (2013), available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17672066/pirates-
somalia-ending-threat-rebuilding-nation. 
11. Kaija Hurlburt & D. Conor Seyle, The Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 
2012, at 33 (Oceans Beyond Piracy & One Earth Future Found., 
Working Paper, 2013) (on file with OBP). 
12. Id.  
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(PAGs).13 Many of these groups were observed operating in critical 
areas in the Indian Ocean, but this high number of potential attackers 
was not consistent with the low number of attacks actually reported 
based on historic rates.14 Second, the success rate for attacks (based 
on the number of successful attacks as a percentage of total attacks) 
actually increased in 2012 after showing a downward trend over the 
previous two years.15 This increase runs counter to the widely held 
belief that ships were less vulnerable after implementing BMP and 
other measures. Finally, there is ample anecdotal evidence from both 
Somali sources and from private companies themselves that not all 
attacks are reported and that many encounters have occurred in 
which neither party (the private security team or the pirates) had 
motive to report the incident.16 
B.  The Shipping Industry’s Continued Commitment 
At the height of the piracy crisis in 2010–2011, the shipping 
industry made enormous commitments to protect its vessels. As 
documented in the Economic Cost of Piracy Reports by OBP, 
measures adopted by the shipping industry amounted to around 
$5 billion over the course of 2012, which represented around 
85 percent of the total direct costs of piracy to the international 
community.17 The measures taken by the shipping industry were 
encapsulated in an industry-generated, self-governing mechanism 
called the “Best Management Practices (BMP) for Protection against 
Somalia-Based Piracy.”18 Recommended measures included 
ship-hardening techniques, suggestions for increased vigilance of crew, 
increased transit speeds, and established re-routing procedures. Also 
incorporated by most of the industry was the practice of developing a 
safe room, or “Citadel,” where a crew could safely retreat in the event 
of a piracy attack until a naval response could be summoned.19  
 
13. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at xxii (2013) (showing figures 
indicating a peak in piracy incidents in Somalia in 2011 and early 2012).  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id.  
17. Bellish, supra note 9, at 1–4 (finding that the shipping industry incurred 
protection costs through, among others, armed guards and ransom 
payments, where the total direct costs of piracy to the international 
community was between $5.7 and $6.1 billion).  
18. Bibi van Ginkel & Lennart Landman, In Search of a Sustainable and 
Coherent Strategy, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 727, 740 (2012). 
19. Id.; see also BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION 
AGAINST SOMALI BASED PIRACY 5, 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_5 
_2011.pdf [hereinafter BMP4]. 
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At the height of the crisis, it was estimated that up to 80 percent 
of the shipping industry was practicing this expensive set of 
recommendations in spite of the industry’s economic downturn that 
had created very slim profit margins.20 However, the fact that so 
many companies were observing these practices created a “level 
playing field,” which ensured that no company could reap an 
economic advantage. This system was sustainable until the perceived 
lack of threat led some companies to unilaterally stop participation 
and revert to pre-BMP practices by slowing down their vessels, 
“cutting the corner” by Somalia, and disregarding other 
ship-hardening recommendations in the BMP.21  
The shipping industry has also reluctantly agreed to undertake 
the embarkation of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel 
(PCASP). These teams, which cost an average of $40,000 to $60,000 
per transit,22 are not only expensive but also logistically challenging to 
embark and leave the industry vulnerable to liability issues. It should 
be noted that the use of armed security is not a part of BMP 
procedures but was understood to be a means of supplementary 
protection for vulnerable vessels. Although the use of PCASP is 
completely voluntary, it is estimated that up to 60 percent of the 
ships transiting the high-risk areas of the Indian Ocean routinely 
embark these teams, and many use them as replacements for 
implementing other BMP recommendations.23  
Over the last several months, there have been decreases in 
registered and reporting vessels as well as documented evidence that 
ships are traveling closer to the coast and transiting at slower 
speeds.24 This un-leveling of the playing field has essentially 
 
20. Stephen Askins, Creation of New Industrial Standards and Compliance 
Regulations 1 (June 2012) (on file with the United Arab Emirates 
Counter Piracy Conference), available at http://www.counterpiracy.ae/ 
upload/Briefing/Stephen%20Askins-Essay-Eng-2.pdf.  
21. See Ships Cutting Corners, SEC. ASS’N FOR THE MAR. INDUS. (Sept. 27, 
2013), http://www.seasecurity.org/2013/09/ships-cutting-corners/ 
(stating that with fewer attacks, more ships are “sneaking around the 
corner” near Somali coasts, risking pirate attacks). 
22. Id. 
23. Bellish, supra note 9, at 19; see also Robert Wright, Ships Slow Down in 
Pirate Waters to Save Fuel, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d6d962e-984e-11e1-ad3e-00144feabdc0. 
html#axzz2pnRml8Xf. (noting that “shipping companies have switched 
to relying on guards . . . for protection”).  
24. See Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Ships with Armed Guards Seen Not 
Reporting Somali Pirate Strikes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-23/ships-with-armed-guards-
seen-not-reporting-somali-pirate-strikes.html; Ships Cutting Corners, 
supra note 21; Wright, supra note 23. 
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jeopardized further shipping industry support for following BMP, as 
most companies will not continue to participate in procedures that 
leave them at a competitive disadvantage. 
C.  The Naval Response 
The involvement of international navies has been a leading factor 
in reducing the incidence of piracy at sea. Since 2009, three 
international navy coalitions, EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, 
NATO Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force-151 
(CTF-151), have been patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the Western 
Indian Ocean.25 These coalitions are in addition to several unaffiliated 
nations who have also contributed their efforts. These so-called 
“independent deployers,” including China, Russia, South Korea, and 
Japan, have also made significant contributions.26 Further, the NATO 
and EU efforts are currently authorized by political mandate through 
the end of 2014,27 while the U.S.-sponsored CTF-151 has an undefined 
commitment to counter piracy.28 Although it is believed that both the 
NATO and EU mandates will be extended through 2016, it is of 
importance to note that nations still must volunteer their forces, and 
a political mandate does not guarantee adequate forces will be 
generated. In this age of military austerity and fiscal constraint, many 
nations may abstain from participation, especially in light of the 
perceived lower threat level. In addition to the vessels and aircrafts 
patrolling the high-risk areas, coordination mechanisms, such as 
SHADE, have been created to coordinate naval activity in the Indian 
Ocean.29  
D.  The Possible Return to Historic (Pre-Piracy) Levels  
of Maritime Security 
As indicated in the response from the shipping industry, there is a 
strong desire to return to shipping patterns and protections in place 
prior to the current outbreak of piracy. As we have also seen, the slow 
atrophy of those companies committing to the continued use of BMP 
has un-leveled the playing field and may render it economically 
unfeasible for some shipping companies to continue. Essentially, a de 
facto abandonment of BMP might already be occurring. However, 
before the official change to pre-piracy levels of maritime security can 
be made, it will be necessary to assess a number of factors to 
 
25. Bellish, supra note 9, at 14 (describing EUNAVFOR’s Operation 
Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and CTF-151). 
26. Id. at 3. 
27. Id. at 14. 
28. See id. at 15 (showing that there is no termination date for CTF-151).  
29. Id. at 17. 
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determine the minimum amount of protection that must remain in 
place in order to ensure safety for vessels at sea.  
One important factor to consider is that the publicity generated 
from successful pirate attacks on both the east and west coasts of 
Africa has brought to light the vulnerabilities of merchant vessels that 
can be exploited by criminal elements. Modern ships are meant to 
deliver goods in an efficient and cost effective manner. Consequently, 
these ships are manned with a minimum number of crewmembers, 
meaning that a large tanker could be manned by as few as fifteen to 
eighteen crewmen.30 This leaves very few crewmen available for extra 
watch duties and to respond to attacks; in contrast, navy frigates and 
destroyers can be manned by upwards of 200 people.31 Ships are also 
made to efficiently operate at relatively slow speeds in order to save 
on bunkering fuel, and many have very low freeboards (i.e., low in the 
water) when loaded with product—thus providing easier access for 
pirate attacks.32 The small number of crewmen, slow operating speeds, 
and low deck heights above the water make some categories of 
modern merchant vessels inherently vulnerable to the kinds of attacks 
that Somali pirates mastered by the mid-2000s. 
In addition to the physical characteristics of the vessels, there 
have also been changes in the dynamics of the maritime sector that 
have altered traditional relationships between a vessel and the flag it 
carries. Whereas in the past, ships were registered with traditional 
nautical nations with large navies, the shift to Open Registries 
(sometimes called Flags of Convenience) means that this close 
connection no longer exists.33 In practice, this means that the 
traditional naval powers have no direct obligation to protect vessels 
flagged in other nations and has created a disconnect in which the 
large flag states for merchant vessels are not associated with the large 
 
30. See N. WINCHESTER ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF CREWING LEVELS: FINDINGS 
FROM THE SIRC GLOBAL LABOUR MARKET SURVEY 12–13 (2006), 
available at http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/uploads/publications/Analysis% 
20of%20crewing%20levels.pdf (finding that some larger vessels do not 
contain a proportionate level of staff).  
31. Bellish, supra note 9, at 16.  
32. See Phillip J. Ballou, Ship Efficiency Management Requires a Total 
Solution Approach, 47 MAR. TECH. SOC’Y J. 83, 83 (2013) (stating that 
reduced speeds lead to lower fuel consumption); see also Peter Shadbolt, 
Asia’s Sea Pirates Target Treasure of Marine Fuel, CNN (Feb. 8, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/08/world/asia/asia-piracy/index. 
html (explicating how a ship’s low freeboard risks pirate attacks). 
33. David F. Matlin, Note, Re-Evaluating the Status of Flags of 
Convenience Under International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1017, 
1019–20 (1991) (explaining Open Registries and their advantages). 
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naval powers.34 Due to this shift in the traditional relationship 
between navies and merchant ships, a new model for the protection of 
shipping must focus on cooperation amongst multiple stakeholders in 
the maritime sector. 
IV.  Assumptions and Primary Factors for 
Consideration 
Based on the above arguments, the following assumptions can be 
made regarding what a safe and sustainable End Game for countering 
piracy must take into account: 
(1)  Due to exposed vulnerabilities of modern shipping, ship 
owners must commit to retain some parts of BMP in order 
to ensure the safety of their vessels and cannot expect to 
go back to historical levels and methods of protection; and 
(2)  Due to the lack of a firm relationship between the flag 
state and the ship-owner, large navies can no longer be 
relied on as the sole guarantors of protection from 
maritime crime: a multi-stakeholder solution must be 
implemented.  
Taking in to account the assumptions above, several specific 
issue-areas should be examined to determine changes necessary to 
establish a sustainable solution to piracy over the longer term. 
A.  Factor One: Response Capability at Sea 
Intervention by naval forces has been the traditional response for 
piracy incidents. The initial area of the Somali threat, the Gulf of 
Aden, was small enough to reasonably expect a navy response to the 
threat of attacks. However, the success of the navy forces in detecting 
and disrupting attacks caused the pirates to turn to the Somali Basin 
along the Eastern coast of Somalia and later across the whole of the 
Indian Ocean.35 This increase in range was made possible by the 
pirates’ use of captured mother ships to provide increased range. Once 
the High Risk Area (HRA) had expanded to this extent, the navies 
reached out to the shipping industry to help provide better reporting, 
information sharing and increased use of citadels to allow more time 
for an effective response. Another demand on naval forces, 
 
34. Cf. id. at 1053 (recounting cases where open registry vessels had subpar 
conditions, partly due to the fact that “the flag state did not have a 
genuine link, [and] the flag state could not exert effective control over 
the vessel so as to avoid these substandard conditions”).  
35. See Lee Willett, Pirates and Power Politics: Naval Presence and Grand 
Strategy in the Horn of Africa, 156 RUSI J. 20, 22 (2011) (detailing a 
“balloon effect” of the navy pushing pirates into other areas). 
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particularly the EU Naval Forces, was the requirement to provide 
individual escorts for humanitarian support vessels, World Food 
Program shipping carriers, and other vulnerable vessels.36  
In light of increased demand on these assets, the navies have 
increasingly relied on embarked uniformed security teams, known as 
Vessel Protection Detachments, to protect vulnerable shipping and to 
free up patrolling assets.37 Naval forces are also economized through a 
focus on more intelligence-driven tactics to identify, track and disrupt 
PAGs. This proactive response has better focused navy efforts but 
relies heavily on expensive intelligence and surveillance assets, which 
are in high demand in other theaters. Lastly, in order to maximize the 
impact of the various naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the SHADE 
process was developed to better integrate the navy forces of the three 
larger coalitions as well as independent deployers. SHADE provides 
the forum for participating nations to de-conflict patrol areas, 
organize convoy protection along the Internationally Recognized 
Transit Corridor, and coordinate the use of scarce assets such as 
surveillance platforms and re-fueling tankers.38 
However, in spite of all these efforts, navies still were unable to 
provide individual protection for all vessels. In response, the shipping 
industry adopted the practice of hiring private security teams to repel 
pirates at the point of attack. While many of these teams were 
deployed before they were officially sanctioned by flag states and 
coastal nations, there was eventual consensus across most 
stakeholders that the guards were necessary as an interim measure to 
protect vessels and crews. It should be noted, however, that the 
industry is strongly opposed to “institutionalizing” the use of armed 
guards and would like to turn away from this requirement as soon as 
practicable.39 
Some have argued that the long-term solution to maintaining a 
response capability for piracy attacks is to build up regional forces, 
 
36. See Fact Sheet: EU NAVFOR Somalia—Operation ATALANTA, 
EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERV., http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/ 
missions-and-operations/eu-navfor-somalia/pdf/16102012_factsheet_eu-
navfor-somalia_en.pdf (last updated Oct. 16, 2012) (outlining the 
objectives of the EU’s Operation Atalanta, including protection of 
World Food Programme vessels).  
37. See JAMES BROWN, LOWY INSTIT. FOR INT’L POLICY, PIRATES AND 
PRIVATEERS: MANAGING THE INDIAN OCEAN’S PRIVATE SECURITY BOOM 
9 (2012). 
38. See Andrew Muratore, EU-NATO Co-Operation and the Pirates of the 
Gulf of Aden, 2 AUSTL. J. MAR. & OCEAN AFF. 90, 100 (2010) (describing 
the purpose of SHADE).  
39. See PETER CHALK ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INSTIT., 
COUNTERING PIRACY IN THE MODERN ERA 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF269.html. 
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including a Somali coast guard.40 While some forces in the area, 
particularly those from Seychelles and Kenya, have some capability 
for responding to attacks, the ability of regional forces to respond to 
piracy attacks on the high seas is considered to be many years away. 
This issue is compounded by the fact that the Somali coast, the 
longest in Africa, is not expected to have any organic capability for 
the foreseeable future. 
In sum, we propose that one short-term solution to the piracy 
problem is continued international naval presence and coordination 
mechanisms, with increased emphasis on proactive, intelligence-based 
actions. Further, working with regional and coastal nations to 
facilitate private armed security teams and then improving 
cooperation between the regional teams and navy forces would also be 
another short-term consideration. These cooperation measures could 
include: (1) more transparent and consistent laws on embarkation 
across coastal states; and (2) consistent reporting and overseeing of 
private teams based on internationally recognized processes (e.g., 
International Code of Conduct, International Standards Organization 
processes). However, the international community should also take 
into account the long-term solution of building regional capacity to 
provide responses to piracy incidents and increase regional leadership 
in coordination processes such as SHADE. 
B.  Factor Two: Maritime Situational Awareness and Reporting 
In order to provide an effective response at sea, a comprehensive 
understanding of where both friendly and merchant traffic is located, 
as well as an understanding of where suspect or threatening vessels 
are lurking, is required. Collectively, this information is known as 
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA).41 The wide range of factors 
that contribute to MSA include: position self-reporting by vessels, 
radar contacts, Automated Information System (AIS) transponder 
information, reports by naval vessels and coast watchers, Long Range 
Information and Tracking (LRIT) information provided by flag states, 
and information provided by other vessels at sea.42 The SHADE 
 
40. See Ken Menkhaus, Dangerous Waters, 51 SURVIVAL 21, 25 (2009) 
(describing the need for a Somali coast guard and stronger local law 
enforcement). 
41. Capt. Dale Ferriere et al., The Office of Global Maritime Situational 
Awareness: A Collaborative Approach to Government Information 
Sharing, 66 PROCEEDINGS 10, 11 (2009) (stating that the goal of MSA is 
to improve knowledge of the maritime domain by persistent monitoring 
so that trends and anomalies can be detected).  
42. See, e.g., A Review of Federal Maritime Domain Awareness Programs: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Mar. Transp. of the H. 
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 112th Cong. (2012) (written 
testimony of Vice Admiral Peter Neffenger, U.S. Coast Guard Deputy 
Commandant for Operations) (explaining how the U.S. Coast Guard 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Somali Piracy—Are We at the End Game? 
367 
mechanism has also been used to ensure optimal employment of 
surveillance platforms and coordination of vessel information to 
ensure any gaps in coverage are addressed. 
A comprehensive MSA system enables faster navy reaction, better 
protection for vulnerable shipping, and proactive re-routing from 
emerging threats at sea. This system is largely in place but is heavily 
reliant on international structures such as the EU’s Maritime Security 
Center – Horn of Africa (MSC-HoA) and the UKMTO.43 The missions 
of these organizations are based on crisis response mandates that 
must be renewed by political decisions of their parent organizations 
and cannot be relied upon indefinitely.44  
Regional structures, such as the Information Sharing Centers 
(ISCs) in Sana’a, Dar Es Salaam, and Mombasa, and the Regional 
Maritime Coordination Centers (RMCCs) throughout the Indian 
Ocean have thus far had limited involvement in developing MSA. 
This is largely due to limited funding, training and equipment and 
their inability to coordinate timely responses to attacks.45 There is 
also a lack of trust from the shipping companies, which are hesitant 
to provide the regional structures with sensitive information. 
However, because of their permanent mandates, regional structures 
offer a logical and long-term solution to building permanent MSA 
once their current weaknesses can be overcome. Thus, the 
international community should consider reform as a three-tiered 
process, where transitioning from reporting infrastructure and MSA to 
regional organizations and leadership is the ultimate long-term goal. 
To reach this final stage, the international community should begin 
with a short-term, immediate strategy of establishing closer liaisons 
and information sharing between the shipping industry, private 
 
utilizes AIS, LRIT, and other systems to increase maritime domain 
awareness).  
43. See About MSCHOA and OP Atalanta, MAR. SEC. CTR.—HORN OF 
AFR., http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/about-us (last visited Dec. 30, 
2013) (explaining how MSC-HoA provides 24-hour monitoring and 
coordination between shipping and military forces); see generally UK 
Maritime Trade Operation, ROYAL NAVY, http://www.royalnavy.mod. 
uk/Operations/Maritime-Security/Keeping-the-Sea-Lanes-Open/UK-
Maritime-Trade-Operation (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (explaining how 
UKMTO acts as the main point of contact for commercial vessels and 
the military in the region). 
44. See About MSCHOA and OP Atalanta, supra note 43 (describing 
MSC-HoA’s mission for Operation Atalanta, where its mandate is 
subject to EU Council Joint Action approval).  
45. See Press Briefing: Piracy Information-Sharing Centre in Mombasa 
Commissioned by IMO Secretary-General, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Mar. 31, 
2011), http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/15-
mombasa-isc.aspx (announcing the creation of the Mombasa RMCC, 
and explaining the function of other ISCs and RMCCs).  
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security teams, and navies, with a focus on incentivizing cooperation. 
As a medium-term consideration, the international community should 
continue the SHADE mechanism as the means to integrate 
international and regional efforts.  
C.  Factor Three: Law Enforcement on the High Seas 
To successfully develop a sustainable solution to Somali-based 
piracy, a myriad of legal issues will need to be resolved and a 
framework put in place for the prosecution and imprisonment of those 
convicted. Although we have seen an improvement in the willingness 
of some nations to prosecute pirates, the high percentage of “catch 
and release” incidents, where pirates caught red-handed are released 
back on the beach, highlights the many legal issues that need to be 
resolved in order to develop a long-term solution. Much of the lack of 
clarity surrounding the legal side of piracy stems from the confusion 
surrounding overlapping jurisdictions. While historically a flag state 
represented the owner, crew, and interest of a vessel, this is not true 
in present day; each incident of piracy affects numerous countries. 
This is because the ship-owner, crew, and flag can all hail from 
different nations, giving any incident a multinational nature. Due to 
the resulting vacuum of accountability, pirates are often released 
without standing trial or being held accountable for their crimes.  
Prosecuting pirates is easy on paper, yet hard in practice. 
Although piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction, a lack of both 
political will and evidence sharing creates difficulties. Some of the lack 
of political will stems from the economic cost of both prosecution and 
imprisonment, which cost the international community $14.89 million 
in 2012.46 The high costs provide a deterrent not only for the 
international community but also for Somalia, regional nations, 
seafaring nations, and flag states that do not have the economic 
capacity to finance trials or the physical capacity to hold the pirates 
in their prisons. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime has provided 
support to these nations by both financing the trials and 
imprisonments, as well as through the building of prisons in Garowe, 
Puntland, and Hargeisa and Bossaso in Somaliland.47 Additionally, 
Working Group Two of the CGPCS has spearheaded efforts to 
establish transfer agreements, allowing arresting authorities to 
 
46. Bellish, supra note 9, at 27.  
47. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, COUNTER PIRACY PROGRAMME: 
SUPPORT TO THE TRIAL AND RELATED TREATMENT OF PIRACY SUSPECTS, 
ISSUE 11, at 3 (2013) (reporting the construction of various correctional 
facilities for convicted pirates).  
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transfer suspects for trial and prosecuting nations to transfer 
convicted pirates back to Somalia for incarceration.48  
Apart from the high cost of prosecuting and imprisoning pirates, 
the lack of standardized evidence gathering and sharing makes it 
difficult to produce a full range of evidence in court. This has 
improved through the years with organizations, such as INTERPOL, 
launching initiatives aimed at improving evidence collection and 
dissemination, building regional capacity to arrest and investigate 
cases, and improving coordination and information-sharing among 
other organizations, such as Europol, NCIS, SOCA, and NATO.49 
Although improvements have been made, a continued commitment is 
needed to ensure that the regional nations, and Somalia particularly, 
have the capacity to respond to piracy through a rule of law 
approach. 
Another factor, albeit unique to Somalia, is the lack of awareness 
and understanding of international legal procedures among the general 
public. Consequently, there is no system to notify communities and 
families that captured pirates have been prosecuted and incarcerated. 
Even though over 1,000 Somali pirates have been convicted or are 
awaiting trial, there is no system in place to exploit the messaging 
opportunities and build deterrence for piracy using the rule of law.50 
In short, we recommend that the international community take 
into account three short-term general strategies to combat the piracy 
problem: (1) continue to support the building of regional prosecution 
capacity in line with U.N. Secretary General-identified goals; (2) gain 
full cooperation of all maritime stakeholders to ensure 100% sharing of 
evidence for prosecutions; and (3) broaden the scope of nations that 
either contribute to regional prosecutions or prosecute, to include 
seafaring nations and major flag states. However, through 
 
48. Working Group 2, CONTACT GRP. ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMAL., 
http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action=workSub2 (last visited Sept. 
25, 2013). 
49. See generally Maritime Piracy: International Involvement, INTERPOL, 
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Maritime-piracy/International-
involvement (detailing INTERPOL’s work with international 
organizations to combat piracy) (last visited Sept. 25, 2013); see also 
UK Crime Agency’s Visit to INTERPOL Highlights Co-Operation 
Against Transnational Crime, INTERPOL (Apr. 8, 2010), 
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2010/N20100408 
(showing the cooperation between SOCA and Interpol).  
50. See AMBER RAMSEY, CIVIL MILITARY FUSION CTR., BARRIERS TO 
PROSECUTION: THE PROBLEM OF PIRACY 2 (2011), available at 
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/Piracy/Documents/CFC%20Anti-
Piracy%20Thematic%20Reports/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_ 
Prosecution_Aug_2011_FINAL.pdf (suggesting that without a legal 
regime to make piracy more risky, there is no adequate deterrent to 
piracy). 
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(1) ensuring prosecution; (2) consistent sentencing; and 
(3) coordinating messaging campaigns, the international community 
may build long-term and stable deterrence against piracy through rule 
of law. 
D.  Factor Four: Vessel Awareness/Protection 
In response to the crisis of Somali-based piracy the shipping 
industry developed a set of voluntary vessel protection measures 
known as BMP, intended to decrease the likelihood of a successful 
attack as well as provide protection for the crew in the event of a 
pirate boarding. The shipping industry has coordinated its initiatives 
with other stakeholders in Working Group Three of the CGPCS.51 
The first version of BMP was released in February 2009, with the 
most recent, version four, released in 2011.52 BMP is built around 
three fundamental requirements: (1) register with MSC-HoA; 
(2) report to UKMTO; and (3) implement ship protection measures.53 
Ship protection measures vary from ship to ship but often include: 
providing additional lookouts and enhancing means of operation 
through better technology; using increased speeds in HRAs; enhancing 
bridge protection; and using physical barriers such as razor wire and 
water spray.54  
While BMP has proven useful and greatly reduces the chances of 
successful attack, these measures are expensive, with re-routing and 
increased speeds alone costing the international community over 
$1.82 billion in 2012.55 Due to these high costs and the perception that 
the threat of Somalia-based piracy has lessened, some in the shipping 
industry are slowly moving away from BMP measures. The movement 
of some ship-owners away from BMP creates an uneven playing field 
and thus encourages more ship-owners to stray from the BMP 
guidelines in order to garner a greater profit. Ultimately, the shipping 
industry would like to move away from the expensive BMP 
recommendations, return to pre-2005 security measures, and ensure 
an environment in which vessels can travel at optimum efficiency 
without added risk to crew and cargo.  
 
51. Working Group 3, CONTACT GRP. ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMAL., 
http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action=workSub3 (last visited Dec. 
30, 2013).  
52. Id.; see Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, MSC.1/Circ.1332 (June 16, 
2009), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/Piracy 
ArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/MSC.1.Circ.1332.pdf. 
53. BMP4, supra note 19, at v.  
54. Id. at 7, 23, 25, 28, 32.  
55. See Bellish, supra note 9, at 19 (showing how implementing BMP4 
recommendations have led to increased costs).  
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Aside from BMP measures, such as vessel hardening, private 
security teams have been a major factor in the decrease of successful 
pirate attacks, as no commercial vessel with an armed team on board 
has been hijacked.56 Although the use of armed teams has been 
controversial in the past and is not mentioned in BMP, the teams are 
accepted as a necessary, although not ideal or permanent, measure. 
However, the presence of armed teams on board vessels creates an 
added liability on the ship-owner and/or flag-state, which could be 
held accountable in the event of a tragedy. This has already occurred 
in the case of the Enrica Lexie, in which Italian Marines 
misinterpreted the intent of an approaching vessel and shot and killed 
two Indian fishermen.57  
While BMP and private security teams have reduced the number 
of successful pirate attacks, we cannot declare an End Game to 
Somali-based piracy as long as we have defined High Risk and War 
Risk Areas. These defined areas are agreed upon by the shipping 
industry (HRA) and the Joint War Committee (War Risk Area). As 
long as the Risk Areas remain in force and there is a continued need 
for armed guards, we cannot consider that we are at the End Game of 
the piracy threat.  
In the short to medium term, we suggest that it is in the 
international community’s best interest, to regulate the use of private 
armed teams through internationally applied governance and 
consistent application of more transparent coastal state laws. In the 
medium term, the international community should consider the 
continued need for defined Risk Areas in the Indian Ocean. As a 
long-term consideration, regional states and the international 
community as a whole should strive to create conditions that obviate 
the need for private armed guards. 
E.  Factor Five: Conditions of Seafarers 
While Somali-based piracy has dropped dramatically, seafarers are 
still affected on a daily basis. When transiting the HRA, they put 
themselves in harm’s way, often without receiving the proper 
preparation or the benefits for which they are eligible. For seafarers, 
the actual piracy incident is often just the beginning of the traumatic 
situation in which they find themselves; hostages often deal with 
psychological, physical, and economic trauma from the time they are 
boarded to well after their release. In order to declare a sustainable 
end game to piracy, seafarer support should be predictable and 
consistent and cover all aspects of seafarer life that have been affected 
 
56. Id. at 19. 
57. Tom Wright & Margherita Stancati, Italy, India Clash over Ocean 
Shooting, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj. 
com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204778604577239163888809948.  
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by the incident of piracy, much as other work-related incidents are 
handled in other industries. 
One of the larger problems in dealing with seafarer issues is the 
seafarers’ lack of representation. Seafarers hail predominately from 
poor nations and often lack the awareness and education about the 
dangers that they may face, the training that they require, and the 
benefits that they are eligible to receive.58 This lack of awareness leads 
to the exploitation of seafarers by manning agencies and other bodies. 
However, while many seafaring nations have a long way to go in 
regard to ensuring seafarer awareness and safety, gains have been 
made. For instance, seafaring nations such as the Philippines require 
seafarers to undergo counter-piracy training prior to embarking on 
their voyages. While the training does not prepare seafarers for all 
scenarios onboard, seafarers did report an increased feeling of safety 
as a result of pre-trip training sessions.59 While nations such as India 
and the Philippines have made efforts to increase the awareness of 
seafarers,60 other stakeholders intentionally fail to notify seafarers of 
potential or imminent entry into the HRA and their right to 
disembark. Although seafarers have a right to disembark, many will 
not choose this path out of fear of being blacklisted and being unable 
to find future work.  
Much like the legal issues discussed earlier, the numerous 
stakeholders involved in each incident of piracy create a void of 
accountability regarding the treatment and support of seafarers. As 
previously mentioned, seafarers often do not receive the benefits to 
which they are entitled prior to, during, and after a voyage. Economic 
benefits are often disregarded, such as double wages for the days 
spent in the HRA, which are stipulated in the International 
Bargaining Forum-High Risk Area Agreement.61 This omission 
impacts not only the seafarer himself but also his family at home, who 
rely on his wages. Furthermore, after a hostage situation has been 
resolved and the seafarers released, seafarers require a multitude of 
services including repatriation and long-term physical and 
 
58. See Hurlburt & Seyle, supra note 11, at 1 (describing the numerous 
difficulties seafarers and their families face in the event of piracy).  
59. See id. at 10 (finding that seafarers felt safer in Somali waters after 
receiving briefings on how to use BMP and cope with piracy). 
60. See MPHRP Train the Trainer Sessions in India, MAR. PIRACY 
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PROGRAM (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www. 
mphrp.org/news_details/index.php?NewsID=165; see Press Release, 
Nat’l Mar. Polytechnic, NMP Conducts Orientation-Seminar on 
Anti-Piracy Course for Seafarers, http://www.nmp.gov.ph/frames/pdf/ 
FB2.pdf. 
61. See 2012–2014 IBF Framework TCC Agreement, INT’L TRANSP. 
WORKERS’ FED’N art. 17.3, http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/ 
seealsodocs/33555/20122014IBFFrameworkTCCAgreement.pdf. 
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psychological care. Post-treatment support is rarely provided for 
seafarers, and many continue to suffer and are unable to return to 
work years after the incident.62 Much of the issue surrounding 
payments to seafarers stems from a lack of tracking systems and 
administrative bodies to ensure that seafarers receive the necessary 
support throughout their voyages as well as after their releases.63  
Although information channels and reporting mechanisms have 
improved as a result of the efforts of Working Group Three of the 
CGPCS, seafarer advocacy groups, flag state commitments, and other 
initiatives, more work must be done to ensure seafarer awareness and 
safety. Until all hostages are released and seafarers can confidently 
travel through the HRAs, piracy is not over. 
Therefore, as a short-term consideration, the international 
community should take into account solidifying stakeholder 
expectations for seafarer welfare before, during, and after attacks 
through ongoing Working Group Three efforts. Furthermore, we 
suggest that the international community recognize institutionalizing 
gains in seafarer welfare as a long-term consideration. 
V.  Governance Ashore – The Real End Game  
for Somali Piracy 
The international community has successfully mitigated the crisis 
of Somali-based piracy at sea. However, now that the crisis mitigation 
phase is over, we must begin to assess and develop the End Game, 
which requires a more sustainable level of effort and commitment over 
the long term. 
While this article mostly addresses the response at sea, there must 
be more support and increased commitment through better 
governance on shore, security, and economic development. The piracy 
business model is founded on poverty, lack of opportunity onshore, 
and a lack of governance to keep criminal elements in check. Only by 
changing these conditions through efforts on shore and off shore will 
piracy be over for good. Breaking the piracy business model must 
occur on three different levels: (1) the recruiting pool must decrease; 
(2) pirate groups must be disbanded; and (3) financiers must no 
longer be willing and/or able to fund PAGs.  
The pirate foot soldiers comprise the largest workforce in the 
piracy business model and require special attention for the End Game 
 
62. See Save Our Seafarers Press Release: Seafarer Death Toll Mounts as 
Somali Pirates Hijack, Torture, Intimidate & Murder, INT’L TRANSP. 
WORKERS’ FED’N (June 20, 2011), http://www.itfglobal.org/press-
area/index.cfm/pressdetail/6110/region/1/section/0/order/1. 
63. Hurlburt & Seyle, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that owners and 
companies frequently do not provide support for seafarers, leaving them 
to their own resources). 
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to be successful. In February 2013, the President of the Federal 
Government of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, offered amnesty to 
the pirate foot soldiers with the aim of providing them with the 
opportunities for alternative means of earning a living.64 The concept 
of reintegrating these pirates into the community is controversial, as 
many argue that the pirates are common criminals and should be 
imprisoned rather than given a second chance among the community. 
Regardless of stance on the issue of reintegration, a framework should 
be established for how to deal with the large number of now 
out-of-work pirates; as long as the pirate groups are still intact, it is 
difficult to argue that piracy is over. 
The most influential tier of the Somalia-based piracy business 
model is that of the financiers. These individuals are responsible for 
providing the money to PAGs. Up to this point, the international 
community has not been successful in bringing these people to justice, 
and unfortunately, their continued presence signals that action groups 
can still be quickly financed and sent to sea.65 
VI.  Conclusion 
Although the piracy business model has yet to be fully 
dismantled, the immediate crisis of Somali-based piracy has been 
successfully mitigated. Unfortunately, while the crisis has been 
mitigated, the situation on the ground has not improved enough to 
declare piracy over and the End Game reached. This article focuses 
on ensuring a long-term commitment at sea through the continuation 
of naval operations, BMP, and private security, but the conditions 
that bred, and continue to breed, piracy still remain in place. For the 
international community to truly establish its End Game, we must 
see a continued dedication to better governance systems, the building 
of regional and Somali legal and institutional capacity, and a 
strengthening of security sectors.  
 
64. See Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Offers Amnesty to 
Pirates, THE NEWS TRIBE (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.thenewstribe. 
com/2013/02/28/somali-president-hassan-sheikh-mohamud-offers-
amnesty-to-pirates/. 
65. See DANIEL J. WHITENECK ET AL., PIRACY ENTERPRISES IN AFRICA 16–18 
(2011), available at http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/piracy/ 
subsaharan-africa/CNA%20-%20Piracy%20Enterprises%20in%20Africa. 
pdf (describing three piracy financing business models); see also 
Rudolph Atallah, Pirate Financing: Understanding and Combating a 
Complex System 2–3 (Apr. 18–19, 2011) (on file with UAE 
Counter-Piracy Summit), available at http://www. 
uaecounterpiracysummit.com/briefing_papers/Atallah,%20Pirate%20Fi
nancing%20Understanding%20and%20Combating%20a%20Complex%20
System.pdf (stating that the limited research into key pirate financiers 
“represents a gaping hole” in the current counter-piracy approach).  
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